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Abstract 
 
We use a field experiment to investigate whether race affects how responsive state legislators are 
to requests for help with registering to vote. In an email sent to each legislator, we randomized 
whether a putatively black or white alias was used and whether the email signaled the sender’s 
partisan preference. Overall, we find that putatively black requests receive fewer replies. We 
explore two potential explanations for this discrimination: strategic partisan behavior and the 
legislators’ own race. We find that the putatively black alias continues to be differentially treated 
even when the emails signal partisanship, indicating that strategic considerations cannot 
completely explain the observed differential treatment. Further analysis reveals that white 
legislators of both parties exhibit similar levels of discrimination against the black alias. Minority 
legislators do the opposite, responding more frequently to the black alias. Implications for the 
study of race and politics in the United States are discussed. 
 
Keywords: discrimination, descriptive representation, race and politics, responsiveness 
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Introduction 
Political equality is considered to be one of the defining characteristics of a democracy 
(Dahl 1956; Verba 2003). In the past, American democracy has consistently failed to live up to 
the standard of political equality, especially with regards to its treatment of racial minorities.  
Despite progress made in the latter half of the 20th century, many researchers argue that racial 
minorities continue to be politically disadvantaged and underrepresented relative to their white 
counterparts (e.g. Fraga 1992; Hajnal 2009). In contrast, other researchers have suggested that 
racial discrimination against blacks in the political sphere may no longer be a concern in the 
United States (for review see Hajnal 2009: 39), with some going as far as to argue that blacks 
and other minorities are in fact overprivileged in the political sphere (Thernstrom 1987; Chavez 
1992).  More broadly, especially in the wake of Barack Obama’s election, many Americans have 
come to share the view that full equality for blacks has arrived or is due to arrive soon. 
In recent years, political and judicial decision-makers have also sought to appraise 
America’s progress towards racial equality. Although the United States Supreme Court upheld 
core provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in the case Northwest Austin Municipal Utility 
District Number One v. Holder in 2009, Chief Justice Roberts wrote in the 8-1 decision that “We 
are now a very different nation,” going on to characterize whether “conditions” today have 
sufficiently improved to warrant striking down the Voting Rights Act as “a difficult 
constitutional question.” As the New York Times reported, such language “suggest[s] that the 
court [is] steeling itself to make a major pronouncement about the role of race in American 
democracy.” 
Because there remains significant uncertainty about whether the political system remains 
biased against minorities, we conducted a field experiment in October 2008 involving 4,859 U.S. 
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state legislators to test whether race affected how responsive legislators were. Each legislator in 
the experiment received an email asking for help with registering to vote. In the experiment, we 
randomized whether the email was sent from a putatively black alias or a putatively white alias. 
One reason for comparing whites and blacks, in addition to the important normative reasons 
raised above, is that blacks have a well-known history of disproportionately voting for 
Democrats, allowing us to test the possibility that discrimination may persist in the political 
system merely as an epiphenomenon of legislators’ strategic partisan considerations.  We 
attempted to estimate the importance of these considerations by also randomizing whether the 
email signaled the sender’s partisan preference. 
The results of our experiment show that the black alias receives significantly fewer 
responses than the white alias.  Further analyses of the heterogeneous treatment effects by the 
legislator’s party and the experimental groups that signal partisan affiliation show that 
legislators’ strategic partisan considerations can at best explain only a portion of the observed 
differential treatment in favor of the white alias.  We then explore an alternative explanation for 
the discrimination that we observed – the race of the legislators themselves. White legislators of 
both parties discriminate against the black alias at nearly identical, statistically significant rates, 
while minority legislators do the opposite, responding more frequently to the black alias. This 
suggests, as many have argued, that the race of elected officials significantly affects how well 
minorities are represented. Our results also suggest that race remains a significant barrier to 
equality in the American political system. 
Should Race Affect Legislators’ Responsiveness? 
 Given that legislators are often assumed to be empty vessels that adapt to their 
constituency in order to maximize their vote share and that constituency service does not force 
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legislators to take unpopular positions that would alienate voters (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 
1987), we would not expect legislators to discriminate against individual requests for 
constituency service on the basis of race.  Indeed, such service helps legislators develop a 
reputation for getting things done for their constituents (Fenno 1978: 108).  Similarly, there are 
reasons to expect that legislators’ personal characteristics do not impact whether they exhibit 
discrimination. With regard to race in particular, prominent works have similarly argued that 
legislators of any race can be expected to serve minorities with similar effectiveness (e.g. Swain 
1993). 
However, other research suggests that racial discrimination remains present throughout 
American politics and society. Significant racial biases exist in the job market (e.g. Bertrand and 
Mulliainathan 2004; Pager and Quillian 2005).  Furthermore, evidence suggests that racial 
stereotypes are still widespread (Bobo 2001) and constitute a potent force in American politics 
(e.g., Kinder and Kam 2009). Combined with biases from existing institutions (Frymer 1999; 
Hajnal 2009), these factors may all lead to a situation where blacks are underrepresented.  
Furthermore, there are at least two additional reasons why we might expect legislators to engage 
in discrimination based on race.   
Descriptive Representation 
First, we might expect rates of reply to differ across the putatively racial aliases based on 
the race of the legislators themselves. Much previous research has suggested that legislators who 
share descriptive characteristics with their constituents may better represent and advocate for 
their interests and policy preferences (e.g., Whitby 1997; Canon 1999; Chattopadhyay and Duflo 
2004; Griffin and Newman 2007; Grose, Magnum and Martin 2007). Indeed, one of the 
arguments for increasing the number of minorities and women who serve as elected officials is 
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based on the expectation that elected officials better represent those who share their personal 
characteristics (Canon 1999). Then again, as already noted, other prominent scholars downplay 
the relationship between race and representation entirely, arguing in line with more traditional 
assumptions about politicians that legislators of all races can adequately represent their 
constituents (e.g. Swain 1993; Thernstrom and Thernstrom 1997).  Thus the question of whether 
descriptive representation affects responsiveness remains up for debate. 
Statistical versus Taste-based Discrimination.  
Second, we might observe legislators engaging in discrimination because of strategic 
partisan considerations. Fenno noted, “Every member has some idea of the people most likely to 
join his reelection constituency… During a campaign these people will often be ‘targeted’ and 
subjected to special recruiting or activating efforts” (1978: 9).  Similarly, Bartels writes, 
“Rational candidates are impelled by the goal of vote maximization to discriminate among 
prospective voters, appealing primarily to those who either are likely to vote and susceptible to 
partisan conversion or reliable supporters susceptible to mobilization (or likely opponents 
susceptible to demobilization)” (1998: 68).   
Because blacks in recent decades have consistently voted for Democratic candidates 
about 90 percent of the time, while whites have typically split their votes more evenly (ANES 
2005), Republican legislators receiving an email from someone with a putatively black name 
would probably infer that he or she is more likely to vote for the Democratic candidate. 
Republicans therefore might be less responsive to a request from someone named DeShawn due 
to strategic considerations. This is one form of what economists refer to as “statistical 
discrimination,” since it is based on rational expectations given overall statistical trends (see 
Altonji and Blank 1999). Statistical discrimination stands in contrast to what economists term 
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“taste-based discrimination,” which is based on factors like racial prejudice that are not readily 
explicable by rational choice (e.g. Becker 1957).  
Fryer and Levitt (2004) highlight that it is difficult to convincingly differentiate between 
taste-based and statistical discrimination; what appears to be taste-based discrimination may 
often be another form of statistical discrimination.  Indeed, researchers can almost never 
definitively classify discrimination as taste-based.  However, this does not mean that we cannot 
effectively study discrimination.  For example, we can test for given types of statistical 
discrimination by including the relevant information that legislators might infer from an 
individual’s group identity directly into the message and then observing whether any residual 
discrimination remains.  In this paper we test for statistical discrimination driven by the average 
partisan preferences of different racial groups.  Our goal is not to definitively identify taste-based 
discrimination, but to see whether there is evidence of discrimination even after experimentally 
controlling for a potentially important source of statistical discrimination: voters’ expressed 
partisan preferences. 
Is the distinction between statistical and taste-based bias important for democratic 
practice?  From the perspective of someone on the receiving end of discrimination, the answer is 
no.  Such discrimination is unfair whatever its source and violates the democratic principle of 
equality embodied in such ideals as one person/one vote.  In the NAMUDNO case cited at the 
beginning of this article, the Supreme Court was concerned with systemic discrimination 
regardless of its source.  Therefore, even if we are unable to convincingly identify and control for 
all potential sources of statistical discrimination, our findings are important because they 
demonstrate the existence of systemic discrimination.  
While it is thus sufficiently significant to simply document whether political inequality 
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exists, we think that it is important for democratic practice to try to differentiate between these 
two types of discrimination because knowing the reasons for discrimination helps identify the 
potential rage of solutions possible for overcoming it.  For instance, it might be the case that 
individuals of low socio-economic status face discrimination for taste-based reasons or because 
they vote at lower rates, which makes officials less responsive to them than to individuals of a 
higher socio-economic status who are more likely to vote (i.e. a form of statistical 
discrimination).  The solution to making officials more responsive to those with low socio-
economic status will depend on which of these reasons best explains politicians’ discriminatory 
behavior.  In the latter case, efforts might focus on helping increase voter turnout among those 
with a lower socio-economic status.  If, however, officials discriminate because of their taste-
based preferences then different tactics would be necessary. To the extent that research should 
not simply identify discriminatory behavior but also inform attempts to correct such behavior, 
understanding the source of discrimination will be crucial.  This article represents a step in that 
process. 
The Experimental Design 
Our experiment allows us to evaluate the competing claims about the nature of racial 
political inequality and representation described in the previous section. Our research design is 
similar to an approach taken in Putnam’s seminal book Making Democracy Work (1993: 73). 
Like Putnam we contact public officials to measure their level of responsiveness; however, we 
build on Putnam’s approach by randomizing the personal characteristics of the individuals who 
are ostensibly making contact.  More generally, academics in other fields and federal agencies 
employ this type of approach to measure whether there is discrimination in such arenas as 
housing markets, job markets, and even government agencies (Fix and Turner 1998; Bertrand 
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and Mulliainathan 2004; Pager and Quillian 2005).  
Why Responsiveness? 
As Pitkin (1967: 209) defines the term in her classic work, political representation is 
“acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them.” Determining how 
responsive legislators are to their constituents and not just how they vote is important for at least 
four reasons. First, as Hall (1996) notes, roll-call votes tell us nothing about the intensities of 
legislators’ preferences or their priorities.  Looking at the level of effort paints a fuller picture of 
how well legislators represent their constituents. Second, government officials provide 
individuals with important avenues for accessing government services. As Young (1990) argues, 
researchers should focus on inequities in the processes by which resources and political power 
are distributed, not simply the end results of these processes. Third, evidence suggests that when 
minorities and women view their representatives as more responsive, they participate in politics 
at higher rates (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Griffin and Keane 2006).  Thus if descriptive 
representation affects the responsiveness of officials, it may in turn affect the political activity of 
traditionally underrepresented groups.  Finally, it is advantageous from a methodological 
perspective that the email senders have straightforward interests: they want a response.  It is 
therefore clear when the legislator is acting in the interest of the minority group; such clarity is 
not always possible with roll call votes where there are often complex policy interests at stake 
and confounding variables present. 
Treatment Conditions 
Box 1 provides the full text of the email sent to state legislators, with each legislator 
receiving just one email. We signaled the race of the email sender by randomizing whether the 
email was signed by and sent from an email account with the name Jake Mueller or the name 
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DeShawn Jackson. We also manipulated the text in order to signal the partisan preference of the 
email sender.   
We chose the first names Jake and DeShawn because Fryer and Levitt (2004) show that 
these names are among the most racially distinct. Among individuals named DeShawn, almost 
all are black; among individuals named Jake, almost all are white. Similarly, we chose the 
surnames Mueller and Jackson because data from the 2000 Census indicate that among common 
surnames, these were, respectively, among those most strongly correlated with self-identification 
as white or black (Word, Coleman, Nunziata, and Kominski n.d.). 
(Insert Box 1 About Here) 
We signaled the partisan preference of the email sender by including text in the letter 
asking whether there was anything the sender needed to do in order to register in future primary 
elections; here we randomized whether they asked about Democratic primary elections, 
Republican primary elections, or did not specify a party (see Box 1). Crossing the race treatment 
with the partisanship treatment gives a total of 6 treatments.  We designed these treatment 
manipulations to first measure whether legislators discriminated against blacks, and then to test 
whether there was evidence that this discrimination could be explained by legislators simply 
inferring the partisan preference of the sender from their race. By holding constant the partisan 
preference of the letter’s sender, we can see if the discrimination we observed was due to 
strategic partisan considerations and also determine if any residual discrimination remains that is 
not attributable to these considerations.1 
                                                
1 To verify that the larger patterns of partisan support among whites and blacks in the United States were also 
reflected in the individuals with the names used for the aliases in our study, we examined the distribution of party 
registration among the individuals with these names in an available voter file (Kentucky’s). The data, available in 
the Supporting Information, indicate that the last name Jackson and the first name DeShawn are indeed both strong 
signals of a Democratic partisan preference. The ratio of people registered as Democrats compared to the number 
registered as Republicans is 2:1 among people with the last name Jackson and 8:1 among people with the first name 
DeShawn. In contrast, people with the first name Jake or Jacob and the last name Mueller are split evenly across the 
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 Also note that the text of the email dealt specifically with a request for constituency 
service.  Because this experiment only examines constituency service, we cannot determine 
whether legislators respond differently to their constituents in other domains.  While we do not 
expect legislator behavior to significantly differ across domains of responsiveness, only further 
research can definitively determine whether this is true.  
The Sample 
Our sample includes state legislators in 44 US states with valid email addresses that were 
available online through state legislative websites in September 2008.2  Note that we treat state 
legislators' email addresses and not necessarily the state legislators themselves. The response (or 
lack thereof) to any of the emails that we sent may have come from someone other than the 
legislator, such as a staff member. However, because we use the legislators’ official email 
addresses from their respective state's legislative website, the persons responding to the request 
did so in an official capacity on the behalf of the legislators. Additionally, as elaborated in 
Appendix D of the Supporting Information, there is no evidence for a heterogeneous treatment 
effect in more highly professionalized legislatures, indicating that this concern is unlikely to 
threaten the external validity of our results.  
Experimental Execution and Responsiveness Measurement  
Once we collected the data, we assigned legislators to treatment groups using block 
randomization by state, legislative chamber, political party, and whether the legislator was up for 
reelection. This method balances the number of legislators sharing these characteristics across 
treatment groups, while allowing each observation to remain equally likely to be assigned to 
                                                                                                                                                       
two parties. Again, this is strong evidence that legislators are likely to infer that DeShawn Jackson is much more 
likely to have a preference for Democratic candidates than someone named Jake Mueller.   
2After sending the emails, about 5 percent of them immediately bounced back as undeliverable because the email 
addresses were no longer valid. For our analysis we limit the sample to the emails that were successfully sent out. 
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each of the treatment groups.3  We sent the emails on the first weekend of October 2008 because 
several of the states’ voter registration deadlines were the following week. We wanted to send 
the emails before these deadlines passed, but also during the time when the legislators were busy 
with the campaign season, so that they could potentially use that extra level of activity as an 
excuse for ignoring the email.4  In addition, by sending out emails just weeks before the 2008 
General election, we ensured that the strategic partisan considerations we tested for were highly 
salient for legislators.5  Finally, our dependent variable for the analysis is whether the state 
legislator responded at all by November 4th, Election Day in 2008. The advantage of this 
measure is that it is objective: did the legislator reply or not?  
Ethical Considerations 
 While field experiments are becoming increasingly common in political science, field 
experiments on public officials by academics are relatively rare (for prominent exceptions see 
Putnam 1993; Bergan 2009).  In fact, most field experiments on public officials have been 
funded and conducted by federal agencies as a way of auditing whether government programs 
discriminate on the basis of race (Fix and Turner 1998; see especially chapter 6).  Because the 
use of field experiments on public officials by academics is relatively rare, we discuss here the 
ethical considerations we took into account before conducting our experiment and explain the 
                                                
3 To test the robustness of our randomization scheme, we tested for any differences among the other observables on 
which we did not block: the legislative district’s total population, the racial composition of the district, the race of 
the legislator, and the Squire (2007) index of state legislative professionalism. The results of our randomization 
check indicate that our randomization scheme was highly successful, χ2(52) = 30.03, p = .9966. 
4 We believe this was successful because even among legislators who ultimately did reply, several noted the 
business of the campaign season as a reason for the lateness of their response. The following example comes from a 
legislator in Alaska in response to the Jake alias: “I apologize that your message arrived in the midst of my email 
account being bombarded with messages from around the world about Sarah Palin. In our efforts to clear these 
messages, I fear we overlooked your message...” 
5 Because we sent all of the emails at the same time, the time between when legislators received the email and the 
voter registration deadline differed across states. Since the partisan composition of legislatures also varies across 
states, one potential concern is that any differences we observed between the parties might simply be the result of 
differences in how long each group had to respond before the voter registration deadline came. We tested this 
possibility, the results of which appear in Appendix A of the Supporting Information, and found no significant 
differences between the two parties. 
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steps we took to ensure that our experiment would involve minimal risk to our subjects. Our 
hope is that others will engage in similar introspection before experimenting on public officials.  
Indeed, we hope that researchers using more traditional observational, survey, and interview 
methods will make similar considerations in their work since the issues we discuss are not 
necessarily unique to experimental work (Dexter 1964).  We should also note that we received 
IRB exemption before conducting this experiment.   
In conducting the experiment we considered three ethical issues.  The first was the use of 
deception: we used fictitious aliases when contacting legislators and experimentally manipulated 
what information was conveyed. This was particularly important because we wanted to test 
whether public officials engage in discrimination based on the race and partisanship of the 
individual contacting them. The ability to randomly assign these characteristics to individuals is 
only available in a field experiment with fictitious individuals; similar considerations explain 
why fictitious names and resumes are used in similar studies of labor market discrimination (e.g. 
Bertrand and Mullianathan 2004).  While some deception was thus necessary for the completion 
of this particular experiment, we believe that researchers should employ deception with great 
care and attempt to minimize its use.  
Second, we considered how to minimize any harm that our experiment might cause. 
Consequently we have taken steps to maintain the anonymity of legislators’ responses in order to 
ensure that our experiment is not used to tarnish the reputation of any given legislator.  This is 
also important from a scientific perspective because it would be misleading to report the 
behavior of a given legislative office.  Because we do not observe all potential outcomes (the 
response to a request from all combinations of race and party signal) for any given legislator, we 
do not know how they would have responded to the other treatments. We can only make average 
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comparisons across groups of legislators.  
Finally, we considered how to minimize the burden placed on legislators’ time.  In so 
doing we tried to achieve the standard set by Putnam when he describes his own experiment as 
“slightly deceptive, but innocuous and highly informative” (1993: 73). We felt that some burden 
was necessary because, as Hall (1996) suggests, seeing how legislators choose to expend time 
and effort is the best way to learn about their priorities.  That said we tried to choose a request 
that would be fairly easy to respond to so that we did not prevent legislators from doing work for 
their constituents.  Based on the responses we received, we believe that we were successful.  Of 
the replies that we received (nearly half of the legislative offices did not reply), the median reply 
was 291 characters long.  Assuming an average word length of 5 characters plus a space after 
each word, the median message we received was only 49 words long, roughly the length of the 
remainder of this paragraph. Accordingly, we believe that the way we conducted our experiment 
caused no significant harm to the state legislators who were our subjects or their constituents 
who may have been seeking their help at the time.  Likewise, any future experiments should 
similarly try to keep requests short and simple. 
Results 
 Just over half of the state legislators responded to our emails: we received 2,747 
responses to the 4,859 emails that were successfully sent (a 56.5% response rate). However, the 
putatively white and black aliases did not enjoy similar rates of reply. Table 1 shows these 
differences and the overall rates of reply for each of our experimental groups. Among the emails 
that did not signal partisanship, legislators responded to 60.5% of the emails sent from the Jake 
alias but only 55.3% of those from the DeShawn alias, a statistically significant difference of 5.1 
percentage points (p=0.04). The OLS regression results in Table 4 in the appendix shows that 
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this result is robust to controlling for a number of legislator, district, and state characteristics (see 
Column 1 of Table 4). (Researchers interested in the other determinants of legislative 
responsiveness may also be interested in the coefficient values in Table 4, though with the usual 
caveats applied to these non-randomized characteristics.) 
(Insert Table 1 about here.) 
However, note that there appears to be no discrimination along racial or partisan lines in 
the experimental groups that signaled the partisanship of the sender (shown in the right half of 
Table 1). Of course, as we argued above, there are theoretical reasons to expect heterogeneous 
treatment effects by the party of the legislator; Republicans and Democrats are likely to react 
quite differently to these partisan signals. Indeed, in order to test whether legislators are using the 
voter’s race to infer the voter’s partisan preference and engage in statistical discrimination, we 
must examine the response rates by party of the legislator. Similarly, there are theoretical reasons 
to expect heterogeneous treatment effects by the race of the legislator.  The estimated -5.1 
percentage point difference (see column 1 of Table 1) represents the average treatment effect 
across all legislators and may miss important heterogeneity in the treatment effect by race of the 
legislator.   
The next two subsections test for heterogeneous treatment effects by the legislator’s party 
and race. When interpreting the heterogeneous treatment effects by the legislators’ party and race 
it is important to remember that we did not randomize legislators’ characteristics, and that some 
confounding variable may be driving the observed results.  As a robustness check, we try to 
minimize this potential concern by controlling for the numerous legislator, district, and state 
factors, including whether the legislator was up for reelection, their legislative chamber, the 
population and median household income of the district, census data on the percent white and 
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percent black of the population in the district, the Squire index of legislative professionalism for 
the state, and whether the state is located in the South.  These OLS regression results are given in 
Table 4 in the Appendix and show that the results continue to hold when controlling for these 
factors. 
The Supporting Information also shows that our results are robust to the inclusion of 
interaction terms for the Squire index of state legislative professionalism, the percent of a district 
that is black, whether a legislator was up for re-election, and whether the legislators were from 
the South. In all cases these interaction terms are insignificant while our main findings continue 
to strongly hold. 
Still, the results regarding the race and party of the legislator should be interpreted with 
caution because they were not randomized; while we can say with confidence that legislators 
with certain characteristics discriminated in certain ways, we cannot robustly attach causality to 
these characteristics. 
Partisanship and Strategic Considerations 
Recall that one motivation of our experiment was to test whether there is evidence that 
legislators engage in statistical discrimination by responding favorably to those who, based on 
their race, were expected to be of the same political party.  We are able to answer this question 
because we randomized both the putative race and partisan preference of the email sender. In 
particular, we randomized whether the email asked about registering for Democratic primary 
elections, Republican primary elections, or did not specify a party (refer to Box 1 for the exact 
wording).   
If the discrimination we observed against the DeShawn alias is due to legislators using 
race to infer partisan preference, then we should observe two things: (1) when no partisanship is 
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signaled, Republicans should favor the Jake alias and Democrats should favor the DeShawn 
alias, and (2) when the sender’s partisan preference is signaled, the observed discrimination 
between DeShawn and Jake should disappear.  That is, when partisanship is signaled, the 
sender’s race conveys no additional information about their partisan preference and any 
statistical discrimination based on strategic partisan considerations should disappear. 
We begin by testing whether there is evidence that the legislators noticed and acted on 
the partisan preference signaled in the email. Because the partisan signal was part of the second 
paragraph of the email, it is possible that those reading the email may have missed this signal.  
However, the results in Table 2 suggest that the legislative offices did notice and react to the 
partisanship signal.  On average, Republican legislators were 4.3 percentage points more likely 
to respond to those who expressed interest in a Republican primary than to those who indicated 
interest in a Democratic primary (p=0.10). Democrats on the other hand were just over 5 
percentage points more responsive to those who expressed interest in a Democratic primary than 
those who expressed interest in a Republican primary (p=0.03).  These results are robust to 
inclusion of the control variables (see column 3 of Table 4).  Legislators are more responsive to 
requests from individuals of their own party. 
(Table 2 About Here) 
Given that there is evidence that legislators are more responsive to co-partisans, is there 
evidence that they infer partisanship from race and use this information to respond strategically?  
As we explained above, we are able to test this question by comparing the difference in response 
rates when no partisanship is signaled (the last line of Column 1) to the estimated response rates 
when partisanship is signaled (the last lines of Columns 2 and 3).  The results show that there is 
no evidence to suggest that Democratic legislators engage in statistical discrimination based on 
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inferred partisanship; in both experimental conditions the difference in how responsive 
Democratic legislators are to the putatively white and black aliases is statistically insignificant.   
The evidence is more mixed for Republican legislators.  When partisanship is not 
signaled (see Column 1), Republicans are estimated to be 8.1 percentage points less responsive 
to the DeShawn alias than the Jake alias.  This pattern is consistent with the possibility that 
Republican legislators may use the race of the individual to infer something about the voter’s 
partisanship. Since blacks in recent decades have consistently voted for Democratic candidates 
about 90 percent of the time, while whites have typically split their votes, Republican legislators 
receiving an email from someone named DeShawn would probably infer that he is likely to vote 
for Democratic candidates, and therefore respond less frequently. 
If this discrimination were explained entirely by strategic partisan considerations, we 
would expect the rates of response to each racial alias to be indistinguishable when they shared 
the same partisan signal. However, columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 show that Republicans continue 
to reply less to the black alias by 4.8 percentage points (p=0.06) even when the sender has 
indicated a partisan preference. The difference in differences indicates that about 3.3 percentage 
points, or about 40 percent of the original effect, may be due to strategic partisan considerations, 
though this difference in the differences is not statistically significant. Thus, while there is some 
evidence that strategic considerations regarding voters’ perceived partisanship may partially 
motivate the patterns of discrimination that we observed, there remain significant levels of 
discrimination that cannot be explained by these considerations.6 
                                                
6 In the Supporting Information we also show that there is no statistically significant relationship between whether a 
legislator was running for re-election in 2008 and the level of discrimination they practiced against the DeShawn 
alias. This finding indicates that statistical discrimination motivated by factors beyond partisanship (such as beliefs 
about blacks’ average ideology or propensity to vote) may also not be able to readily explain the discrimination we 
observed. As we did not randomize this characteristic, however, we cannot say so definitively. Furthermore, most of 
the legislators in our sample that were not up for re-election in 2008 might run for re-election in a future election 
cycle. However, as we discuss in a subsequent section, legislators running for re-election were much more likely to 
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Descriptive Representation and Responsiveness 
 The results in Tables 1 demonstrated that the DeShawn alias was less likely to receive a 
response than the Jake alias when partisanship was not signaled. While the results in the previous 
section tested whether statistical discrimination could explain this finding, they ostensibly 
suggest that the partisanship of the legislator best explains the discrimination we found, as 
Republicans, but not Democrats, are more responsive to the Jake alias.  However, those results 
do not take into account the possible influence of the legislators’ own race.   
As discussed above, previous research on descriptive representation suggests that 
legislators may be more responsive to individuals from their same racial group.  In other words, 
there may be heterogeneous treatment effects by the legislator’s race, with white Democrats and 
Republicans exhibiting differential treatment in favor of the Jake alias, and minority Democrats 
and Republicans exhibiting differential treatment in favor of the DeShawn alias. Because 
minorities constitute 20.4 percent of the Democratic legislators in our sample but only 2.5 
percent of their Republican counterparts,7 part of the reason that we do not observe Democrats 
exhibiting significant discrimination on average may be that we miss the heterogeneous 
treatment effects by race within party. That is, if whites and minorities discriminate in opposing 
directions (with white legislators favoring Jake and minority legislators favoring DeShawn), then 
Democrats would appear not to discriminate on average even if these two groups within the 
Democratic party did in fact discriminate. 
(Table 3 About Here) 
                                                                                                                                                       
respond overall, indicating that legislators’ re-election status did effect their responsiveness, thus making this non-
finding more substantively significant. 
7 We identified which legislators were black or members of other minority groups (Latino, Arab-American, Native 
American, and Asian-American) by using, respectively, the directories created by the National Conference of Black 
State Legislators, the National Association of Latino Elected Officials, the Arab American Institute, the National 
Caucus of Native American State Legislators and the UCLA Asian American Studies Center. 
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Table 3 reports the reply rates broken down by the race and party8 of the legislator when 
the email does not signal partisan preference. Among Democrats there was significant 
heterogeneity in their observed discriminatory behavior that is related to the race of the 
legislator.  White Democrats were 6.8 percentage points less likely to respond to the DeShawn 
alias than to the Jake alias (p=0.07), while minority Democrats were 16.5 percentage points more 
likely to respond to the DeShawn alias than the Jake alias (p=0.02).  Holding constant the overall 
differences in responsiveness between white legislators and those of any minority group, this 
represents a 23.3 percentage point difference in rates of differential treatment between minority 
Democrats and their white counterparts (p<0.01). 
Like white Democrats, white Republicans were also less responsive to the DeShawn alias 
by 7.6 percentage points (p=0.04), essentially the same behavior that we observed among white 
Democrats. (The small number of Republican legislators who are minorities makes it difficult to 
form conclusions about their behavior.) 
The results in Table 3 were also robust to the inclusion of control variables (see columns 
5 and 6 of Table 4 in the Appendix).  It is particularly noteworthy that when we allow the 
treatment effect to vary by the race of the legislator, Republican legislators are no longer 
estimated to be significantly more responsive to the Jake alias than the DeShawn alias (see the 
results in column 6 of Table 4).  In other words, a legislator’s race, and not her party, is more 
important in predicting discrimination  
Our initial finding that Democrats did not discriminate missed significant heterogeneity 
in the Democratic Party. Recall that when we estimated the level of differential treatment 
Democrats exhibited as a whole (Table 2), we found no statistically significant differences in 
                                                
8 Those interested in viewing the full results of the experiment, including the treatment groups that examined 
partisan affiliation broken down by both race and party, are directed to the Supporting Information. 
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how likely they were to respond to the Jake alias than the DeShawn alias.  However this masks 
the fact that once race is taken into account, white Democrats discriminate at rate similar to 
white Republicans. Much of the reason that we observe Democrats exhibiting on average less 
differential treatment than their Republican counterparts towards the Jake alias is thus related to 
the racial composition of Democratic legislators.  The minority legislators in the Democratic 
party exhibit differential treatment in favor of the DeShawn alias that, when averaged with the 
differential treatment of Jake exhibited by white Democratic legislators, makes it appear that 
Democrats on average do not engage in discrimination.  Yet, when comparing white Republicans 
and white Democrats, the differences in their levels of discrimination are far smaller—less than 
one percentage point. 
One potential criticism of this finding is that because districts with more minorities are 
more likely to elect minorities (a pattern that indeed holds true in our data), the number of 
minorities in a district might be the actual explanatory cause, and the race of the legislator might 
merely be associated with this variable (see Grose 2005). However, using Census data on the 
racial composition of state legislative districts, we find no evidence for a heterogeneous 
treatment effect among white legislators based on the racial composition of their districts. These 
results appear in Appendix D of the Supporting Information. 
A graphical summary of our results appear in Figure 1. Bars extending to the left indicate 
that the legislators were less likely to respond to the DeShawn alias than the Jake alias, while 
bars extending to the right indicate the opposite. The bars’ lengths correspond to the size of the 
effect we observed in percentage points. 
(Insert Figure 1 About Here). 
Discussion 
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In October 2008 we conducted a field experiment to test whether legislators’ 
responsiveness to a request for help with registering to vote depended on the race of the email 
sender. Our analysis showed the following: 
• United States state legislators were less responsive to requests from blacks than from whites 
for help with registering to vote when no signal about partisanship was given (by 5.1 
percentage points). 
• Legislators from both parties were more responsive to co-partisans (by about 4.5 percentage 
points). 
• Overall, Republican (but not Democratic) legislators replied less to the black alias (by 8.1 
percentage points) and, while there is some limited evidence that part of this discrimination is 
strategic, much of it is not; 
• Rather, this remaining discrimination appears to be almost entirely due to the racial 
composition of the parties, as Democratic and Republican whites discriminated against the 
black alias at nearly identical and significant levels (by 6.8 percentage points and 7.6 
percentage points, respectively). 
• Minority state legislators responded much more frequently to the black alias than to the white 
alias (by 16.5 percentage points overall).  
While it is important to remember that our experiment only examines responsiveness to a 
request for help registering to vote and therefore does not necessarily indicate that legislators 
exhibit these patterns of behavior in other domains, each of these findings sheds light on ongoing 
debates both in political science and among institutional actors in American politics. 
 First, one of the arguments often advanced for increasing the number of minority 
legislators through mechanisms such as majority-minority legislative districts is that elected 
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officials better represent people with whom they share characteristics (Canon 1999). Similarly, 
previous research has suggested that black constituents participate in politics at higher rates 
when black legislators represent them because they believe black legislators are more responsive 
to their concerns (Griffin and Keane 2006). While there is ongoing debate about the 
effectiveness of some mechanisms designed to increase the number of minority elected officials 
(e.g. Cameron, Epstein, and O’Halloran 1996; Lublin 1999; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Gay 
2007), our results provide direct support for the broader argument that how effectively minorities 
are represented does depend on the race of their representatives, regardless of their party.   
Second, our results raise concerns that regardless of their party, the very legislators 
responsible for crafting the ways that citizens interact with nearly all American political 
institutions display a willingness to discriminate against minorities when they seek access to 
these institutions. Claims made that legislators may be willing to take action to suppress minority 
turnout (Brennan Center 2008; Barnes 2008) thus receive some support from our results; 
however, our results also indicate that white legislators of both parties, and not just Republicans, 
might be inclined to limit minority turnout for reasons unexplained by these groups’ partisan 
preferences.  
Finally, at the beginning of the paper we discussed the distinction between taste-based 
and statistical discrimination.  In Table 2 we tested whether legislators’ engaging in a specific 
form of statistical discrimination based on voters’ perceived partisan preferences could explain 
their differential treatment in favor of the Jake alias. The results suggest that part but not all of 
the observed discrimination may be due to these strategic partisan considerations.  In particular, 
Republican legislators were differentially favorable to Jake in the no partisanship conditions but 
continued to exhibit statistically significant levels of differential treatment in favor of Jake when 
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the voter’s partisan preference was signaled.  Further, the results by race of the legislator – with 
white legislators being more responsive to the Jake alias and minority legislators being more 
responsive to the DeShawn alias – seem to suggest that the observed differential treatment may 
have more to do with taste-based discrimination. That white legislators of both parties are just as 
likely to discriminate reinforces this interpretation.  However, as noted before, we cannot control 
for all the potential factors that cause legislators to engage in statistical discrimination based on 
race.  Future research may consider other important factors, including the likelihood that a voter 
turns out for elections.   
 Even though we cannot definitively differentiate between taste-based and statistical 
discrimination, our results have important implications for the state of racial equality in the 
United States.  With some on the Supreme Court ready by all accounts to declare discrimination 
a fact of the past in the American political system, our experiment reveals the opposite – we 
found that legislators of every racial group engaged in significant levels of discrimination in 
favor of their racial group.  Race still matters in American politics – both for elected officials and 
their constituents.  While the election of Barack Obama as the United States’ first black president 
is an auspicious development for race relations in America, our politics are still not colorblind. 
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Box 1.  Email Sent to State Legislators 
From: [Treatment Name] 
To: [Legislator’s Email Address] 
Subject: A Question on Registering to Vote 
 
Dear [Representative/Senator] [Legislator’s Last Name], 
 
My name is [Treatment Name] and I’m trying to figure out how to register to vote for the 
upcoming election.  I heard that the voter registration deadline is soon. 
 
Who should I call in order to register? Also, is there anything special I need to do when I register 
so that I can vote in future [{blank}/Democratic/Republican] primary elections? 
 
Thanks, 
[Treatment Name] 
 
Note: Bolded items were manipulated across emails.  Items in italics were assigned randomly 
based on the treatment group.
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Table 1. Overall Effect Sizes – Does Jake Receive More Replies Than DeShawn? 
 No Partisanship 
Signal 
 Republican 
Signal 
Democratic 
Signal 
Party Differential 
DeShawn  
Jackson 
55.3% 
N=806 
 54.3% 
N=810 
57.3% 
N=812 
-2.9% 
(p=0.23) Combined -0.9% 
(p=0.61) Jake  Mueller 
60.5% 
N=812 
 56.4% 
N=820 
55.3% 
N=799 
1.1% 
(p=0.31) 
Race 
Differential 
-5.1%* 
(p=0.04) 
 -2.1% 
(p=0.39) 
1.9% 
(p=0.43) 
 
   Combined Effect 
-0.1% (p=0.95) 
 
Notes: The first column supplies the response rates when partisanship was not signaled while the 
second and third columns, respectively, supply the response rates when the Republican and 
Democratic partisan signals were included in the emails. The last row in each section gives the 
difference in the response rates between the DeShawn and Jake aliases for that particular partisan 
signal. These values are calculated so that positive values indicate a differential treatment in 
favor of DeShawn and negative values a differential treatment in favor of Jake. The last row 
gives the combined race differential when pooling the observations for which partisanship was 
signaled. The second to last column gives the difference between the response rates between the 
Republican and Democratic partisan signals for that particular alias, while the last column pools 
the party differential for both the Jake and DeShawn aliases. Positive values in these columns 
indicate differential treatment in favor of the Republican signal while negative values indicate 
differential treatment in favor of the Democratic signal. P-values (two-tailed) are reported below 
the coefficients. ^Sig. at the 0.10 level (two-tailed), *Sig. at the 0.05 level (two-tailed), **Sig. at 
the 0.01 level (two-tailed).  
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Table 2.  Response Rates by the Treatment Name, the Partisanship Signal, and Legislators’ Party 
(a) Republican Legislators 
 No partisanship  Republican Democrat Party Differential 
DeShawn  
Jackson 
58.9% 
N=360 
 58.0% 
N=362 
54.0% 
N=361 
4.0 
(p=0.28) Combined 4.3^ 
(p=0.10) Jake  Mueller 
67.0% 
N=364 
 63.1% 
N=366 
58.5% 
N=357 
4.6 
(p=0.21) 
Race 
Differential 
-8.1* 
(p=0.02) 
 -5.1 
(p=0.16) 
-4.5 
(p=0.22) 
 
   Combined Effect  
-4.8^ (p=0.06) 
 
 
(b) Democratic Legislators 
 No partisanship  Republican Democrat Party Differential 
DeShawn  
Jackson 
52.4% 
N=446 
 51.3% 
N=448 
59.9% 
N=451 
-8.5** 
(p=0.01) Combined -5.1* 
(p=0.03) Jake  Mueller 
55.1% 
N=448 
 51.1% 
N=454 
52.7% 
N=442 
-1.6 
(p=0.63) 
Race 
Differential 
-2.7 
(p=0.42) 
 0.2 
(p=0.94) 
7.2* 
(p=0.03) 
 
   Combined Effect 
3.7 (p=0.11) 
 
Notes: The first column supplies the response rates when partisanship was not signaled while the 
second and third columns, respectively, supply the response rates when the Republican and 
Democratic partisan signals were included in the emails. The next to last row in each section 
then gives the difference in the response rates between the DeShawn and Jake aliases for that 
particular partisan signal. These values are calculated so that positive values indicate a 
differential treatment in favor of DeShawn and negative values a differential treatment in favor 
of Jake. The last row gives the combined race differential when pooling the observations for 
which partisanship was signaled. The second to last column in each section gives the difference 
between the response rates between the Republican and Democratic partisan signals for that 
particular alias, while the last column pools the party differential for both the DeShawn and Jake 
aliases. Positive values in these columns indicate differential treatment in favor of the 
Republican signal while negative values indicate differential treatment in favor of the 
Democratic signal. P-values (two-tailed) are reported below the coefficients.  ^Sig. at the 0.10 
level (two-tailed), *Sig. at the 0.05 level (two-tailed), **Sig. at the 0.01 level.   
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Table 3.  Response Rates by the Experimental Condition and the Legislators’ Party and Race  
Legislator Party: Democratic Legislators  Republican Legislators 
Legislator Race: Whites Minorities   Whites Minorities 
DeShawn Jackson 54.3% 
N=348 
45.9% 
N=98 
 59.3% 
N=351 
44.4% 
N=9 
Jake Mueller 61.2% 
N=363 
29.4% 
N=85 
 66.9% 
N=356 
75.0% 
N=8 
Race Differential -6.8^ 
(p=0.07) 
16.5* 
(p=0.02) 
 -7.6* 
(p=0.04) 
-30.6 
(p=0.23) 
Notes: The first group supplies the response rates among Democratic legislators while the second 
group supplies response rates among Republican legislators. Within each group, the first column 
presents the results for white legislators of that party while the second column presents the 
results for minority legislators. The last row in each of these column gives the difference in the 
response rates between the DeShawn and Jake aliases for that particular partisan signal. These 
values are calculated so that positive values indicate a differential treatment in favor of DeShawn 
and negative values a differential treatment in favor of Jake. Positive values in these columns 
indicate differential treatment in favor of the Republican signal while negative values indicate 
differential treatment in favor of the Democratic signal. P-values (two-tailed) are reported below 
the coefficients. ^Sig. at the 0.10 level (two-tailed), *Sig. at the 0.05 level (two-tailed), **Sig. at 
the 0.01 level (two-tailed). 
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Figure 1. Heterogeneous levels of differential treatment among subgroups of legislators 
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 Appendix  
 
This appendix reports the results of regression results meant to provide a robustness 
check for the results in Tables 1-3.  These regression results are presented in Table 4.  In all 
cases, the dependent variable is whether the legislative office responded to the email that was 
sent (1=responded, 0=did not respond).  Each model is estimated using OLS regression and 
includes the following control variables: whether the legislator was up for reelection in 2008, 
whether they were part of their state’s Senate or upper chamber, the population and median 
household income of the legislators district (as reported by the Census), Census data on the 
percent white and percent black of the population in the district, the Squire index of legislative 
professionalism for the state, and whether the state is located in the South.  
The relevant treatment effects that correspond to those presented in Tables 1-3 are bolded 
and given at the bottom of Table 4. As these results show, all of the findings from Tables 1-3 
continue to hold even when controlling for these other factors. 
Finally, there are a few control variables that may be of theoretical interest to other 
researchers that were consistently statistically significant predictors across the various regression 
models.  First, as might be expected, legislators running for re-election were between 7 and 9 
percentage points more likely to respond.  Legislators from more affluent districts were also 
more likely to respond – a $10,000 increase in a district’s median household income was 
associated with a 3.2 to 3.8 percentage point greater likelihood of reply. Finally, legislators from 
the South were between 8 and 18 percentage points less likely to respond. Among the variables 
that were not statistically significant, the insignificance of the Squire index of state legislative 
professionalism (Squire 2007) was surprising.
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Table 4. OLS Regression Results for Predicting Legislative Responsiveness: Robustness Check of Tables 1-3 
 No Partisan Signal Partisan Signal No Partisan Signal 
Independent Variable Table 1 Table 2 Table 2 Table 2 Table 3 Table 3 
Randomized Treatments       
DeShawn Treatment -0.052* 
(0.024) 
-0.023 
(0.032) 
- 0.031 
(0.023) 
-0.077** 
(0.025) 
0.062^ 
(0.035) 
Republican Treatment N/A N/A -0.048* 
(0.023) 
- N/A N/A 
Interaction Terms       
Republican Legislator*DeShawn  - -0.065 
(0.047) 
- -0.077* 
(0.034) 
- -0.030 
(0.049) 
Republican Legislator*Republican Treatment N/A N/A 0.092** 
(0.034) 
- N/A N/A 
Minority Legislator*DeShawn - - - - 0.205** 
(0.072) 
0.192** 
(0.075) 
Control Variables       
Republican Legislator 0.065* 
(0.026) 
0.097** 
(0.035) 
-0.050* 
(0.025) 
0.034 
(0.025) 
0.065* 
(0.026) 
0.080* 
(0.035) 
Minority Legislator -0.181** 
(0.048) 
-0.182** 
(0.047) 
-0.118** 
(0.035) 
-0.119** 
(0.035) 
-0.292** 
(0.061) 
-0.286** 
(0.062) 
Up for Re-election 0.090** 
(0.027) 
0.090** 
(0.027) 
0.069** 
(0.020) 
0.069** 
(0.020) 
0.094** 
(0.027) 
0.093** 
(0.027) 
District Population (100,000s) 0.001 
(0.017) 
0.001 
(0.017) 
-0.005 
(0.012) 
-0.006 
(0.012) 
0.003 
(0.017) 
0.002 
(0.017) 
Median HH Inc. ($10,000s) 0.038** 
(0.009) 
0.038** 
(0.009) 
0.032** 
(0.007) 
0.031** 
(0.007) 
0.039** 
(0.009) 
0.038** 
(0.009) 
Senator 0.048 
(0.030) 
0.048 
(0.030) 
0.070** 
(0.022) 
0.071** 
(0.022) 
0.050^ 
(0.030) 
0.050^ 
(0.030) 
Squire Index -0.017 
(0.114) 
-0.017 
(0.114) 
-0.062 
(.080) 
-0.063 
(0.080) 
-0.026 
(0.114) 
-0.026 
(0.114) 
South -0.179** 
(0.031) 
-0.179** 
(0.031) 
-0.076** 
(0.021) 
-0.076** 
(0.021) 
-0.179** 
(0.030) 
-0.179** 
(0.030) 
District White % -0.099 
(0.120) 
-0.099 
(0.120) 
-0.064 
(0.086) 
-0.068 
(0.086) 
-0.095 
(0.120) 
-0.096 
(0.120) 
District Black % 0.050 
(0.132) 
0.050 
(0.132) 
-0.266** 
(0.092) 
-0.268** 
(0.092) 
0.065 
(0.132) 
0.064 
(0.132) 
Constant 0.490** 
(0.122) 
0.476** 
(0.122) 
0.519** 
(0.088) 
0.485** 
(0.092) 
0.495** 
(0.122) 
0.488** 
(0.122) 
N 1618 1618 3241 3241 1618 1618 
R2 0.082 0.083 0.055 0.055 0.087 0.087 
Relevant Treatment Effects       
All Legislators:  
DeShawn Treatment – Jake Treatment 
-0.052* 
(0.024) 
     
Republican Legislators:  
DeShawn Treatment – Jake Treatment 
 -0.088* 
(0.035) 
 -0.046^ 
(0.025) 
  
Democratic Legislators:  
DeShawn Treatment – Jake Treatment 
 -0.023 
(0.032) 
 0.031 
(0.023) 
  
Republican Legislators:  
Republican Signal – Democratic Treatment 
  0.044^ 
(0.025) 
   
Democratic Legislators:  
Republican Signal – Democratic Treatment 
  -0.048* 
(0.023) 
   
Minority Legislators:  
DeShawn Treatment – Jake Treatment 
    0.127^ 
(0.067) 
0.130^ 
(0.067) 
White Legislators:  
DeShawn Treatment – Jake Treatment 
    -0.077** 
(0.025) 
-0.062^ 
(0.035) 
Notes: The dependent variable is whether the legislative office responded to the email.  All models estimated via 
OLS Regression. ^Sig. at the 0.10 level, *Sig. at the 0.05 level, **Sig. at the 0.01 level [All two-tailed]. 
